



# CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION

J-5  
Distribution: A,C,S

CJCSI 2320.01  
9 September 1994

## GUIDANCE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VIENNA DOCUMENT 1992 AND ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS

References: a. Vienna Document 1992 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, March 1992  
b. Helsinki Summit Declaration, 10 July 1992  
c. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (USD(A)) memorandum, 20 June 1991, "Guidance for Department of Defense (DOD) Compliance with the Vienna Document 1990"

1. Purpose. To provide guidance and establish military policy for the implementation of the Vienna Document 1992 (VDOC 92) (reference a) and other confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) agreed to by the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) and subscribed by the USG.

2. Cancellation. MCM-95-92, 13 July 1992, "Implementation Directive for the Vienna Document 1992," is canceled.

3. Applicability. This instruction applies to the CINCs, Services, US Delegation, NATO Military Committee (USDELMC), On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), DIA, and the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff.

#### 4. Background

a. Reference a is a politically binding agreement among the nations participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (Enclosure A). The CSBM provisions are military in nature and therefore, the USG must rely on the military for accurate information in executing the document's provisions (See Enclosure B for interpretation of reference a.). The Secretary of Defense,

through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is the sole conduit for military information and action required by the USG or its various agencies.

b. As a result of negotiations culminating in the Helsinki Summit Declaration (reference b), the participating states of the CSCE established a new FSC. To build upon existing agreements and to give a new impetus to arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building, security cooperation and conflict prevention, the FSC is negotiating measures identified within the Helsinki Summit Declaration's Programme for Immediate Action. The FSC adopted in January 1994 for implementation two measures for further security enhancement and cooperation. These measures, which develop existing VDOC 92 measures, are on Defense Planning and the Programme of Military Contacts and Co-operation. Guidance for implementation of this latter measure is incorporated within this instruction, as will any future measures adopted by the FSC.

## 5. Policy

a. CSBM implementation policy has been developed within the interagency process. This process includes the participation of the DOS, OSD, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), NSC, and the Joint Staff. DIA and OSIA support the Joint Staff and OSD in the interagency process.

b. Responsibilities for compliance with reference a are delineated in reference c and in a USD(A&T) memorandum, "Guidance for Department of Defense (DOD) Compliance with Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (To Be Published)." The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for military compliance with the provisions of VDOC 92 to the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has responsibility for the annual exchange of military information, military contacts and cooperation (including the further enhancements adopted by the FSC, as reflected in 4b above), prior notification of certain military activities, annual calendars, constraining provisions, and observation of certain military activities. DOS is responsible for risk reduction and the annual implementation assessment meeting. OSD is responsible for information on military budgets (including the further enhancements adopted by the FSC for force planning, as reflected in 4b above) and the communications network. OSIA is responsible for carrying out active inspections and evaluations, and will serve as escorts for passive inspections and evaluations.

c. The Conventional Arms Control Division, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5), Joint Staff, is the action office for all routine matters involving implementation and military compliance with the VDOC 92.

d. To comply with the provisions of reference a, and FSC adopted measures, all actions should reflect openness and transparency, keeping in mind appropriate measures to protect classified or sensitive information. Detailed policies are in Enclosure C.

6. Definitions. See Glossary.
7. Responsibilities. Refer to Enclosure D for responsibilities.
8. Procedures. See Appendixes A through K to Enclosure D.
9. Effective Date. This instructing is effective upon receipt.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff :

/Signature/  
CHARLES T. ROBERTSON, JR.  
Major General, USAF  
Vice Director, Joint Staff

Enclosures:

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ENCLOSURE A

LIST OF PARTICIPATING STATES IN THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY  
AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

Albania	Armenia
Austria	Azerbaijan
Belgium	Bosnia-Hercegovina
Bulgaria	Belarus
Canada	Croatia
Cyprus	Czech Republic
Denmark	Estonia
Finland	France
Germany	Georgia
Greece	The Holy See
Hungary	Iceland
Ireland	Italy
Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan
Latvia	Liechtenstein
Lithuania	Liechtenstein
Malta	Moldova
Monaco	The Netherlands
Norway	Poland
Portugal	Romania
Russian Federation	San Marina
Slovak Republic	Slovenia
Spain	Sweden
Switzerland	Tajikistan
Turkey	Turkmenistan
Ukraine	The United Kingdom
The United States of America	Uzbekistan
(Yugoslavia)	

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ENCLOSURE B

INTERPRETATION OF THE VIENNA DOCUMENT 1992

1. General. Explanations are addressed in parallel with the major sections of reference a. Paragraph numbering system of the VDOC is used.

2. Explanation by Paragraph

a. Paragraphs (10) through subparagraphs (11.5.5.2)  
Information on military forces.

(1) Paragraph (10). Information will be reported only for military forces in the zone. "In the zone of application" means permanently stationed in the zone.

(2) Subparagraph (11.1) 1st and 2d footnotes. The term "equivalents" is interpreted as follows:

<u>LAND</u>	<u>AIR</u>
Army	Major Command
Corps	Numbered Air Force
Division	
Brigade/Regiment	Wing

(3) Subparagraph (11.1.1). Provide the number of units (brigade, regiment, Wing, Or equivalent) listed in Chart 1 of the information exchange and the resultant evaluation quota (1 for every 60 units or portion thereof).

(4) Subparagraph (11.2.1). Designation equates to unit title, subordination to immediate higher headquarters.

(5) Subparagraph (11.2.2), fourth footnote. Authorized combat strength equates to war authorized strength.

(6) Subparagraphs (11.2.41 and (11.5.4). Peacetime authorized personnel strength equates to authorized strength.

(7) Subparagraph (11.2.5). Type of weapon and equipment systems should be reported the same way as for CFE under the provisions of the "protocol on existing types." Formations report their total holding of reportable equipment, not just that held by subordinate combat units.

(8) Subparagraph (11.2.5.3). Report on Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles (AIFVs), Heavy Armament Combat Vehicles (HACVs), and Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) as defined in CFE.

(9) Subparagraph (11.2.5.5). Antitank guided missile (ATOM) launchers include only vehicles not reported as ACVs (e.g., US M-901).

(10) Subparagraph (11.3.11). This subparagraph deals with active formations and units. The increase must be over the peacetime authorized personnel strength as listed in the information exchange by the threshold amount and must be for more than 21 days. For formations, personnel increases in separately reported subordinate formations and units are not counted toward that formation's 5,000 personnel threshold. For example, a corps would count only increases in its directly subordinate combat support and service support units and not its divisions, corps artillery brigade, or cavalry regiment because it is subject to its own separate reporting requirements.

(11) Subparagraph (11.3.2). This subparagraph applies to nonactive formations and units reported in the information exchange that are planned to be activated. The activation occurs when more than 2,000 troops are present for more than 21 days.

(12) Subparagraph (11.3.4). The goal is to report increases (11.3.1) or temporary activations (11.3.2) in the annual calendar. However, if plans are made after the submission of the annual calendar, notification should be made at least 42 days in advance of the increase or activation. In the case of no advance notice to the troops (alert activity), notification should be, at the latest, at the time of the increase or activation.

(13) Subparagraph (11.51). "Naval aviation permanently based on land. (land-based naval air (LBNA)) means combat aircraft as defined in CFE and maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) that are subordinate to naval forces but are not based aboard ship.

(14) Subparagraphs (11.5.2) and (11.5.3). An air unit's normal peacetime location and normal peacetime airbase or military airfield may be the same location. If so, it should be reported as such.

b. Paragraphs (12) through subparagraphs (13.111). Data relating to major weapon and equipment systems.

(1) Subparagraph (12.1). Required data and photos (see subparagraph (13.9)) were provided to all parties once on 15 December 1992.

(2) Subparagraph (12.2)

(a) The definition of "new types or versions" was left to the individual states. A new type or version under CFE protocol is considered a new type or version for this measure. Only CFE data are required for all existing systems reported in the December 1991 CSBM Information Exchange.

(b) When a "new type or version" is deployed for the first time in the zone of application, all data are required, including the additional data listed under "Data on new types of versions will . . . ."

(c) If any other state has provided data prior to the United States, the US can, if applicable, certify that data provided by the first state are correct for our weapon system. This certification fulfills US obligation.

(3) Subparagraph (13.2.1.4.2). Seating capacity includes driver and crew.

(4) Subparagraph (13.7.3.11). This subparagraph means systems built into the aircraft, not "hung on." Report as machine gun, etc.

(5) Subparagraph (13.8.3.1). Use CFE helicopter definitions that will help to move the United States toward more comparability between CSBM and CFE data exchanges.

(6) Subparagraph (13.8.3.2 ? . See subparagraph (13.7.3.1) above.

(7) Subparagraph (13.9). Photos will be provided to all parties **once**. CFE photos may be used, but they cannot have "CFE" printed on them. Refer to subparagraph (12.2) above.

(8) Subparagraph (13.11). Format was specifically not defined to avoid any changes in the existing CFE format. Use CFE format for data. "CFE" may not appear on the photos in accordance with (JAW) the CFE treaty.

c. Paragraphs (14) through subparagraphs (15.4).

Information on plans for deployment of major weapon and equipment systems. Report any systems (types of equipment as specified in subparagraphs (11.2.5) and (11.5.5)) that the United States plans to deploy within the ADA the following year.

d. Paragraph (18). USEUCOM and USACOM will provide the in-theater point of contact for all hazardous incidents of a military nature. Reports of potential hazardous incidents of a military nature will be made to the Joint Staff through the NMCS.

e. Paragraphs (19) through subparagraphs (19.2). Voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about military activities.

(1) Paragraph (19). Personnel envisaged to take part in these tours are principally the DAO or other representatives accredited to the host country.

(2) Subparagraph (19.1). There is no specific method for expressing concern. The invitees will most likely be from neighboring states.

f. Paragraphs (20) through (33). Visits to airbases.

(1) Paragraph (20). An airbase visit is not linked to any air activity. The purpose of the visit is exclusively to observe the normal activity of an airbase.

(2) Paragraph (25). When selecting individuals to represent the United States on visits to other nations' airbases, consideration should be given to selecting personnel with aviation background. For protocol reasons, one individual should be, if possible, the rank of O-5 or above.

(3) Paragraph (26)

(a) Negative replies are requested (if applicable) for all types of invitations.

(b) The following information must be provided on all personnel selected to participate in an airbase visit: name; rank; date of birth; place of birth; passport number, place of issue, and expiration date; and travel arrangements, including flight number and arrival time and place.



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(c) Information on travel arrangements may be provided outside the 21-day response time and need not be in the initial message if it is not available. The remainder of the data on personnel nominated must be submitted promptly; i.e., to meet 21-day response time.

g. Paragraphs (35) through subparagraphs (35.4).  
Demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems.

(1) Paragraph (35). Demonstrations are required for new types only. The demonstrations may be done in conjunction with some other CSBM activity (e.g., airbase visits, observations of exercises), or it may be done completely outside a CSBM event, such as during an air or trade show. There is no requirement for a demonstration if another participating state has already given a demonstration of the same weapon or equipment system.

(2) Subparagraph (35.3). All invitations require a positive or negative reply. Information under subparagraphs 2f(3)(b) and (c) above should be included on personnel nominated to participate in demonstrations.

h. Paragraphs (36) through subparagraphs (44.2). Prior notification of certain military activities.

(1) Paragraph (38)

(a) The focus for all notifications is on land forces that are in the field. This notification excludes, among other things, independent naval and air maneuvers and land force activity that takes place in garrison (i.e., not in the field) but includes amphibious landings or parachute assaults in the zone.

(b) The phrase "in the field" is synonymous with the phrase "out of garrison". Only activities occurring outside of garrisons are notifiable. This requirement protects USG capability to use its bases in Europe as a staging area in responding to other worldwide contingencies. A civilian airfield or seaport used temporarily by the military is considered to be in the field.

(c) Single activity refers to a self-contained activity. An exercise-series such as the AUTUMN FORGE series is not a single activity under a single operational command and, therefore, is not notifiable. Individual exercises within a series may be notifiable if they breach the thresholds.

(d) There are three categories of notifications:

1. Engagement of formations in the same field exercise under a single operational command, either independent of, or in combination with, air or naval components.
2. Engagement in an amphibious assault landing or a parachute assault.
3. Arrival or concentration of formations resulting from a transfer of troops, either from outside the zone of application to arrival points inside the zone, or from inside the zone to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable activity or to be concentrated.

NOTE: Land force exercises are normally divided into three phases: deployment, active exercise, and redeployment or recovery. Concentrations, amphibious landings, and parachute assaults are typically one-phase operations.

(2) Subparagraph (38.1). Land forces participating in this single activity must also be controlled by a single operational command. This single operational command refers to the controlling headquarters for the activity that has the authority to assign operational missions to the forces in the field. This single operational command headquarters need not be physically located in the field, but those troops that are controlled by this headquarters and are located in the field will be counted toward the troop and tank strength thresholds.

(3) Subparagraph (38.1.1). Structure, combined with troop or tank thresholds being breached, necessitates notification.

(a) The structural threshold of a divisional structure or two or more brigades or regiments, not necessarily subordinate to the same division, must be met prior to applying the numerical thresholds. Structure exists if the command post is in the field. Elements of the divisions or brigades or regiments represent that unit in determining structure; i.e., a brigade command post in the field represents that brigade.

(b) Once the structural threshold is met, a straight count of all troops participating in this

single activity, which is conducted in the field, and responding to the same single operational command is done. The 9,000 troop threshold accounts for those troops assigned to the activity and also includes those troops supporting the activity. Field-deployed troops conducting combat support or service support functions within the same single activity and responding to the same single with operational command are counted along with those troops in the brigades or regiments when determining if an activity meets the threshold for notification. Troops participating in the activity but from a garrison location are not counted toward the threshold determination.

(4) Subparagraph (38.1.2). Aircraft sorties (excluding helicopters) are those conducted in support of the notified ground force activity described in subparagraph (38.1). Independent air operations will not be reported. For air operations supporting more than one activity, report the number of sorties devoted to the notifiable activity.

(5) Subparagraph (38.2). Notification of amphibious landings and parachute assaults pertains to single-phase amphibious landings or parachute drops with 3,000 or more troops without regard to structure.

(6) Subparagraph (38.2.1). Cumulative troop strength is used in determining if the activity is notified. In determining notifiable troop strength for an amphibious landing, include **only** those troops who come across the beach, by boat or by helicopter. If the exercise is notifiable, personnel pre-positioned ashore in the amphibious landing area who are or will be involved in the landing but do not come across the beach, including support and safety personnel, should be included under subparagraph (42.1.1). If at any time during the amphibious landing or parachute drop the cumulative strength breaches the threshold of 3,000 troops, the entire activity is notifiable. The start time would be the date the first troops land on the beach or drop zone. Accordingly, once the amphibious landing or parachute drop is complete, the activity becomes a traditional land force activity, subject to the same criteria outlined in paragraph (38) and subparagraphs (38.1) and (38.1.1) (i.e., a notification threshold of 9,000 troops and 250 tanks).

(7) Subparagraph (38.3.1). Transfers (i.e., movements) as such are not notifiable or observable. The arrival of those transferred forces is notifiable if the arrival meet. the following three criteria:

- (a) Is in the CSBM zone of application.
- (b) Is in the field; e.g., at a civil arrival point (civilian airfield or seaport) or outside a military garrison.
- (c) Meets the notifiable threshold, structure, and single activity criteria at any time.

(8) Subparagraph (38.3.2). Arrivals at military airbases or military seaports are not subject to notification; however, should the troops involved in the transfer leave the military base at the notifiable level and conduct an otherwise notifiable activity (exercise, concentration), that activity is notifiable. Once the forces are in the CSBM zone, their subsequent military transfers are treated as movements within the zone.

(a) When US forces depart their military arrival points in Europe (which are not notifiable) or civil arrival points (which may be if the criteria is met) to concentrate (assemble) in the field to train, prepare for future military activities, or for any purpose, then that concentration is notifiable if it satisfies the notification criteria (paragraph (38) of the VDOC).

(b) The United States will provide information on notifiable exercise activities in three separate notifications:

1. Deployment Concentration.
2. Active exercise in which deployed troops and forces stationed in Europe participate.
3. Redeployment Concentration.

The United States will provide a single notification depending on the relationship of the phases to the overall exercise.

(9) Paragraph (39)

(a) Alerts (i.e., when troops have no advanced notification of the activity) are an exception to the 42-day notification. Alerts are not forecasted in the annual calendar even if they are preplanned by higher headquarters.

(b) Notification will be given at the time the troops commence the activity. The normal thresholds for notification and observation apply.

The duration of the alert must, however, exceed 72 hours for it to be observable. Even then, only that portion of the alert extending beyond 72 hours is observable. Invitation to observe an alert activity must be sent concurrently with the notification of that activity.

(10) Paragraph (41). Information identified in subparagraphs (41.1) through (41.5) is included in all types of activity notification.

(11) Subparagraph (41.3). In reporting multinational exercise activities, USG policy is to include in US notifications the names of all participating states, number of troops by state, designation, subordination, number and type of formations and units by state, and the total number of tanks disaggregated by state IAW (42.1.1), (42.1.2), and (42.1.3) of the VDOC, respectively. Participating states have agreed to notify military activities when they contribute forces above the threshold level, or when they serve as host state for an activity. Germany will always notify a notifiable US activity that takes place in Germany, whether or not Germany contributes forces, because it is hosting the US activity.

(12) Subparagraph (41.4). Use the generic level of command; e.g., division, corps, or army.

(13) Subparagraph (41.5)

(a) For land force exercises, the 42-day prior notification is counted from the first day of the activity's first phase, regardless if the troop strength has not yet breached the notification thresholds on that day. This is typically the first day of the activity's deployment phase. The end date will be the last day of the redeployment or recovery phase.

NOTE: These dates must be coordinated with the exercise participants.

(b) For amphibious landings and parachute drops, the 42-day prior notification is counted from the first day of the activity's first phase, regardless if the troop strength has not yet breached the notification thresholds on that day. This is the day the first troop lands on the beach or drop zone. The end date for an independent amphibious landing or parachute drop exercise is the completion of the redeployment or recovery phase.

For an exercise that becomes part of a land force exercise, the end date is the date the land force exercise begins.

(c) For concentrations, the 42-day prior notification is counted from the first day that the notification threshold is breached. There is not a concentration or an arrival by definition until the thresholds are breached.

(14) Subparagraphs (42.1) through (42.1.12). Apply only to military activities notifiable under subparagraph (38.1).

(15) Subparagraph (42.1.1). Include all personnel pre-positioned ashore in the amphibious landing area. This requirement should include troops pre-positioned ashore as well as support and safety personnel ashore supporting the amphibious landing. For example, if 3,500 troops came across the beach in the amphibious landing and another 3,000 were pre-positioned ashore in the amphibious landing area to participate in or support the landing, a total of 6,500 troops would be reported here. However, in subparagraph (42.2.1), 3,500 would be reported because this is the number involved in the amphibious landing; i.e., came across the beach.

(16) Subparagraph (42.1.5). Use CFE categories.

(17) Subparagraph (42.1.6). Sorties by aircraft (if notifiable) include sorties by naval aircraft in support of the notifiable ground activity. Helicopters are not included in this category; they are reported in subparagraph (42.1.5).

(18) Subparagraph (42.1.7). Use generic purposes for air missions (e.g., close air support or reconnaissance). The class of air mission termed "battlefield air interdiction" will not be listed as such. The term "air to ground" will be used instead.

(19) Subparagraph (42.1.8). Use generic categories of aircraft (e.g., bomber, reconnaissance, or fighter).

(20) Subparagraph (42.1.9). Use the generic level of command; e.g., squadron, wing, or allied tactical air force.

(21) Subparagraph (42.1.10?). Any naval ship-to-shore gunfire should be so noted. This notation is indicated by a yes or no. There is no requirement to notify simulated ship-to-shore gunfire.

(22) Subparagraph (42.1.11). Yes or no is all that is required to indicate naval ship-to-shore support.

(23) Subparagraph (42.1.12). Use the generic level of command (e.g., fleet, flotilla, squadron). There is no requirement to provide the numbered fleet (e.g., 2d Fleet) or a more precise level of command (e.g., Commander, Naval Forces Atlantic).

(24) Subparagraphs (42.2) through (42.2.2). Apply only to military activities notifiable under subparagraph (38.2).

(25) Subparagraph (42.2). Amphibious landings and parachute assaults are one-phase activities that are not, in the traditional sense, land force exercise activities, although they may be related to other activities.

(26) Subparagraph (42.2.1). Applies only to the troops who actually participate in a ground force activity resulting from an amphibious landing or a parachute assault; in other words, only those troops that ultimately become land forces once they land on the beach or drop zone. Aviation sections that come ashore will be included in troop totals. Air sections that do not come ashore and sea components of these activities are not notifiable.

(27) Subparagraph (42.2.2). Points of embarkation refer only to those start points in the CSBM zone. Do not report embarkation points outside the zone.

(28) Subparagraphs (42.3) through (42.3.4). Apply only to military activities notifiable under subparagraph (38~3).

(29) Subparagraph (42.3). Normally, the United States will not notify an arrival of troops from the continental United States because arrival points are usually military garrisons. The United States will notify subsequent concentrations or activities if it breaches thresholds and meets other notification criteria.

(30) Subparagraph (42.3.2). Use generic types of divisions (e.g., one mechanized infantry division).

(31) Subparagraph (42.3.3). A breakout of tanks by each participating state is to be provided in US channels to assist in identifying total participation.

(32) Subparagraph (42.3.4). Define a box delimited by geographic coordinates (with names of corresponding towns) that will cover the activity's area while not providing the specific locations of garrisons, ports, and points of arrival. USEUCOM input to the Joint Staff should include the actual arrival points, concentration area(s), and POMCUS sites being used.

(33) Subparagraphs (43.2) and (43.3). Pertain to all types of notifications and require the activity to be subdivided into principal phases of the activity, including a brief description of the activity and its corresponding dates.

(34) Subparagraph (44.2). Refers to activities such as the 'Atlantic Resolve' deployment concentration's connection to the follow-on active exercise.

i. Paragraphs (45) through (64). Observation of certain military activities.

(1) Subparagraph (45.4). In addition to field exercises, concentrations with 13,000 or more troops or 300 or more battle tanks are observable (only during the period that the 13,000 troop or 300 battle tank threshold is breached). Arrivals are not normally notified and never observed because the arrival points are usually at military garrisons or airfields (which are not in the field). When these forces depart their garrisons and concentrate in the field or participate in an otherwise observable activity, an observation is required. If a notifiable transfer of troops into or within the CSBM zone breaches 13,000 troops or 300 battle tanks, it becomes an observable activity. If practical, an observation program covering all phases of an exercise may be conducted.

(2) Paragraph (47). In most cases, the United States will coordinate closely with the allies in allocating responsibilities for a joint observation program. Should matters needing interpretation arise, the host state will decide the matter.

(3) Paragraph (51)

(a) The following information must be provided on all personnel selected to participate in observations: name; rank; date of birth; place of birth; passport number, place of issue, and expiration date; and travel arrangements, including the flight number and arrival time and place.



(b) Information on travel arrangements can be provided outside the 21-day response time and need not be in the initial message if it is not available. The remainder of the data on personnel nominated must be submitted promptly; i.e., to meet 21-day response time.

j. Subparagraphs (71.1) through paragraph (74).  
Constraining Provisions.

(1) Subparagraph (71.1). Only one exercise involving more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks can be carried out every 2 years by each participating state.

(2) Subparagraph (71.2). Each participating state is allowed up to six exercises with more than 13,000 troops or more than 300 battle tanks. Of these six exercises only three may have more than 25,000 troops or more than 400 battle tanks. There is no numerical restriction on exercises below 13,000 troops or involving less than 300 battle tanks.

(3) Subparagraph (71.3). No participating state may have more than three exercises going on at the same time if they each involve more than 13,000 troops or more than 300 battle tanks.

(4) Paragraphs (72) and (73). Exercises involving over 40,000 troops or more than 900 battle tanks must be included on two consecutive annual calendars by both the host state and the state with the threshold number of troops or tanks in the exercise.

k. Paragraphs (77) through (1111)

(1) Paragraph (77)

(a) Inviting inspectors from other participating states is voluntary.

(b) The CSCE ad hoc working group will determine whether or not inspectors from other participating states should be invited to participate in an inspection and if so, which states are to be invited to be part of the multinational team.

(2) Paragraph (78). USG policy is to cite "Paragraph 78 of the Vienna Document 1992" as the reason for requesting an inspection (e.g., subparagraph (90.1) of the inspection request).

(3) Paragraph (81). The term "force majeure" is synonymous with natural disaster (e.g., earthquake, flood), extreme weather (e.g., hurricane), or manmade disaster (e.g., Chernobyl nuclear accident). Any decision involving "force majeure" during an on-site inspection of US troops will be made in consultation with the CSCE ad hoc working group.

(4) Paragraph (88). The host state (receiving the inspection) may request that the United States provide two operational helicopters and two ground vehicles for the inspection team during the entire time that US troops are being inspected. Since the United States cannot be a host state for an inspection, it is not obligated to provide such equipment.

(5) Subparagraph (90.9). Not applicable unless another participating state has been invited.

(6) Paragraph (96). If another participating state has been invited, the number of inspectors from that state cannot exceed the number from the inviting state.

(7) Paragraph (100). Providing a map of the specified area is voluntary. Equipment should not be taken from the inspectors for examination out of their sight or dismantled in any way. Should an objection be raised regarding a particular device, the inspectors should agree to not employ it during the inspection, on the understanding that the incident would likely be pursued through diplomatic channels.

(8) Paragraph (103). A briefing is not intended to be used to delay the inspection. Inspectors are only required to take into consideration host-country suggestions as to the advisability of a preinspection briefing. However, there is no requirement on inspectors to receive a briefing, even when offered, if that is not their wish.

(9) Paragraph (111). Responsibility for travel expenses to and from the point of entry does not mean the United States must pay for the invited guests. Prior agreement with the invited state may be required.

1. Paragraphs (112) through (140)

(1) Paragraph (114). Formula for determining the number of evaluation visits a state is obligated to

receive. Actual quotas for the following year will not be known until after the information exchange on 15 December, valid as of 1 January. Paragraph (11.1.1) requires each state to include a statement indicating the total number of units contained in the information exchange and the resultant annual evaluation quota.

(2) Paragraph (116). Annual evaluations of US forces generated by current force levels could be conducted in any country in the zone where there are US combat forces; i.e., not just in Germany.

(3) Paragraphs (117) through (118.5). Describe the nature of the request. Unlike inspections, no reason for the evaluation request is required.

(4) Paragraph (121). It is important that coordination and consultation between the host and stationing state precede the issuance of the reply. In accordance with agreements with states in which US forces are stationed, the United States will be in charge during the actual evaluation visit to US forces. The host state has responsibility for the evaluation team before the start of the evaluation and immediately following the conclusion of the evaluation visit.

(5) Paragraph (123). Nonacceptance of an evaluation visit means that the unit is in its normal peacetime location, but the host state (or stationing state through the host state) has elected to use one of its entitlements to not accept the visit. Nonacceptance is ultimately an option to postpone. In the case of US-stationed forces, a nonacceptance decision would be communicated to the host state during consultations before the reply. The US is entitled to invoke this provision five times for an aggregate of no more than 30 days per calendar year.

(6) Paragraph (124). If a unit is out of garrison during the period of a proposed evaluation, the requesting state may still insist and be granted a visit to the empty normal peacetime location of the requested formation or unit, or the requested state may grant a visit to the unit in the field.

(7) Paragraph (126). "Place of assembly of the team" in the discussion of points of entry provides the possibility of using an in-country attache or embassy officer dealing with military matters as an evaluator.

(8) Paragraph (129). Auxiliary personnel should always be identified as interpreters on the request message.

(9) Paragraphs (131) and (132). The visit begins with the briefing, not with the arrival of the team in country. This procedure allows the option of a team arriving on one day and conducting the evaluation on the next.

(10) Subparagraph (132.1). The only requirement on a receiving state during the evaluation of a formation is to provide a briefing. Beyond that, the receiving state may provide the possibility to see (and by implication, evaluators may ask to see) any of the formation's immediately subordinate elements that **were not reported separately** (e.g., noncombat units and other subordinate elements).

(11) Subparagraph (132.2). With the exception of sensitive points and subelements that are not in their normal peacetime locations, personnel, weapons, and equipment should be available for evaluation. Commanders **are not** required to disrupt training or stage special training exercises for the evaluators.

(12) Paragraph (133). Participating states have a right to restrict access to sensitive points, facilities, and equipment. However, participating states are under an obligation to keep the number to a minimum.

APPENDIX A TO ENCLOSURE B

KEY REFERENCES PROVIDING JOINT STAFF OR USG  
INTERPRETATIONS AND SETTING POLICY

Bilateral Agreement, United Kingdom

Bilateral Agreement, Kingdom of Spain

Bilateral Agreement, Republic of Italy

Bilateral Agreement, Kingdom of The Netherlands

Bilateral Agreement, Republic of Iceland

Bilateral Agreement, Federal Republic of Germany

Memorandum of Understanding among Headquarters, United States  
European Command (HQ USEUCOM), United States Atlantic Command  
(USACOM, formerly USLANTCOM), and On-Site Inspection Agency

(OSIA), "Implementation of the Vienna Document 1990"

National Security Council memorandum, 7 June 1991, "Organizing  
to Manage On-Site Verification of the Conventional Arms Control  
in Europe (CFE) Treaty and Confidence- and Security-Building  
Measures (CSBM) Evaluation Activities"

National Security Directive 41, 29 May 1990

OSIA OPLAN 4-92, CSBM Implementation Plan

Secretary of Defense memorandum, 28 April 1990, "Planning for  
U.S. Compliance with the CFE Treaty"

Under Secretary of Defense memorandum, 20 June 1991, "Guidance  
for Department of Defense (DoD) Compliance with the Vienna  
Document 1990"

Vienna Document 1992

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ENCLOSURE C

POLICIES

1. General. Comments are provided in parallel with the major sections of reference a.

2. Explanation by CSBMs

a. Annual Exchange of Military Information. The annual exchange of information on military forces and plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems must be provided to all other participating states by 15 December of each year. It will be valid as of 1 January of the following year. This data exchange must be updated whenever a new type or version is deployed in the zone of application for the first time. Refer to Appendix A to Enclosure D for procedures and responsibilities.

b. Information on the US Military Budgets. These data will be provided annually to all other participating states no later than 2 months after the budget has been approved. USDP, in coordination with USD(A&T), plans and prepares the annual exchange of military budgets and all enhancements contained in the FSC measure on Defense Planning. The Joint Staff and Services will support as required.

c. Annual Calendars. The annual calendar must be submitted to all participating states by 15 November of each year. Additionally, NATO agreement (C-M(87)39, 29 July 1987) requests nations to exchange draft annual calendars in the NATO CSBM Working Group by 15 October of each year. Refer to Appendix B to Enclosure D for procedures and responsibilities.

d. Constraining Provisions. The intent to carry out, in the second subsequent calendar year, an exercise in excess of 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks must be submitted to all participating states by 15 November of each year.

e. Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities. Prior notification of certain military activities must be given 42 days or more in advance of the start of notifiable military activities, as defined in reference a. Notification will be given by the participating state on whose territory the activity in question is planned to take place even if the forces of that state are not engaged in the activity or their strength is below the notifiable level. The United States must also notify all activities that will exceed notification thresholds. This requirement is in addition to the notification requirements of the host state. Additionally,

NATO requests (C-M(87)39) that its member states send their draft notifications to the NATO CSBM Working Group 60 days before the start of the activity. Refer to Appendix C to Enclosure D for procedures and responsibilities.

f. Alerts (Notifiable Military Activities Carried Out Without Advance Notice). Alerts are exceptions to the requirements for 42 days prior notification. Notification of alerts above agreed thresholds must be given at the time the troops involved commence their activities. Refer to Appendix C to Enclosure D for procedures and responsibilities.

g. Observation of Certain Military Activities. The observation provision has two parts, active and passive. In the case of passive observations, coordination is required with OSIA in the event of simultaneous passive observation and inspection of the same exercise. In the event of an observation of a notifiable exercise in Iceland, USACOM will be responsible. Refer to Appendix D to Enclosure D for procedures and responsibilities.

h. Inspections. Inspections provide the opportunity to evaluate compliance with the agreed CSBMs. OSIA OPLAN 5-91 and the MOU among USEUCOM, USACOM (formerly USLANTCOM), and OSIA provide guidance on inspections. Refer to Appendix E to Enclosure D for procedures and responsibilities.

i. Evaluations. Evaluations provide the opportunity to evaluate the accuracy of the annual exchange of military information. OSIA OPLAN 4-92 and the MOU between USEUCOM, USACOM, and OSIA provide guidance on evaluations. Refer to Appendix F for procedures, responsibilities, and guidance.

j. Contacts

(1) Visits to Airbases. Each participating state with reported air combat units is obligated to arrange at least one visit in a 5-year period to one of its normal peacetime bases. Refer to Appendix G to Enclosure D for procedures and responsibilities.

(2) Additional Military Facility Visit. In addition to the provisions of reference a regarding visits to airbases, each participating state will arrange visits for representatives of all other participating States to one of its military facilities or formations. These visits will give the visitors an opportunity to view activity of that military facility or observe the training of that military formation. Refer to Appendix K to Enclosure D for procedures and responsibilities.



(3) Military Contacts. Participating states will promote and facilitate military-to-military contacts to improve mutual relations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will plan, coordinate, and execute the exchange of military contacts with all other participating states. Refer to Appendix K to Enclosure D for procedures and responsibilities.

(4) Exchange of Information of Military Contact Programs. The participating states will exchange information on agreements on programs of military contacts and cooperation concluded with other participating States. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff plans, coordinates, and executes military contacts and cooperation with all participating States. Refer to Appendix K to Enclosure D for procedures and responsibilities.

(5) Demonstrations. New types of weapon and equipment systems are required to be the subject of a demonstration by the first participating state to deploy the new type in the zone of application. Refer to Appendix H to Enclosure D for procedures and responsibilities.

k. Risk Reduction

(1) Unusual Military Activities. DOS is responsible for the compliance and implementation of the mechanism for consultation and cooperation on unusual military activities. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide support to DOS regarding these activities.

(2) Hazardous Incidents of a Military Nature. DOS is responsible for notifying participating states of hazardous incidents of a military nature. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will support DOS regarding these incidents. Refer to Appendix I to Enclosure D for procedures and responsibilities.

(3) Voluntary Hosting of Tours To Dispel Concerns about Military Activities. DOS is responsible for the compliance and implementation of voluntary visits to dispel concerns about military activities. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide support to DOS regarding these tours. Refer to Appendix J to Enclosure D for procedures and responsibilities.

1. Communications Network. The CSBM communications network establishes direct communications between participating state capitals. This network will complement existing diplomatic channels and will be used for all CSBM-related matters. USEUCOM, USACOM, and OSIA will establish internal procedures for the notification of their actions required by reference a. USD(A&T), in cooperation with the Joint Staff, has developed a data management system to accomplish required notifications and accounting.

ENCLOSURE D

RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROCEDURES

1. Joint Staff

- a. Represent the US military in the USG interagency decisionmaking process.
- b. Coordinate with the Services, USEUCOM, and USACOM to establish US military policy for implementation of and compliance with the provisions of reference a and additional FSC-approved measures.
- c. Take overall responsibility for compliance with reference a and additional FSC-approved measures in the areas of annual exchange of military information, prior notification of certain military activities, annual calendars, constraining provisions, visits to airbases, demonstrations, the program of military contacts cooperation, and observations (See Appendixes A, and B, C, D, G, H, and K and Enclosure C, paragraph 2).
- d. Serve as the US military point of contact to resolve issues with OSD and DOS.
- e. Coordinate with and assist DOS to ensure compliance with reference a in the areas of hazardous incidents (Appendix I), unusual military activities, visits to dispel concerns about military activities (Appendix J), and the annual implementation assessment meeting. Coordinate with and assist DOS to ensure compliance with notifications required by the measure on military contacts and cooperation in the areas of exchange of information on agreements for military contacts and cooperation; visits to military facilities; military contacts; joint military exercises and training; and observation visits.
- f. Coordinate with OSD to ensure compliance with reference a in the areas of seminars and the communications network.
- g. Provide policy guidance to USEUCOM, USACOM, and other appropriate commands as required.
- h. Plan, coordinate, and execute the exchange of military contacts with all other participating states.
- i. Participate as permanent member of the DOD Compliance Review Group (CRG) chaired by USD(A&T).

i. Raise to the CRG for resolution any compliance issues not covered by existing policy or ambiguities related to the provisions of reference a or other FSC-approved measures.

2. USEUCOM

a. Comply with reference a and FSC-approved measures for observations, demonstrations, passive inspections, passive evaluations, demonstrations, and visits to airbase and military facilities within the reference a area of application (AOA) (See Appendixes D, E, F, G, H, and K).

NOTE: In accordance with USD(A) memorandum, 20 June 1991, OSIA will serve as the senior USG representative (who will not necessarily be the senior US military representative) during passive inspections and evaluations. It also specifies that commanders of inspected or evaluated units or formations will retain overall on-site responsibility for compliance with reference a.

b. Coordinate and establish theater military policy and procedures as necessary to comply with reference a and FSC-approved measures.

c. Compile and verify all information required by reference a on equipment, troops, and activities in theater. Specific areas include annual exchange of military information, contacts (visits to airbases and US military facilities), prior notification of certain military activities, observation of certain military activities, annual calendars, constraining provisions, and military contacts and cooperation (See Appendixes A through D, G, H, K, and Enclosure C, paragraph 2).

3. USACOM

a. Comply with reference a for observations, demonstrations, and airbase visits within USACOM AOR (Keflavik) (See Appendixes D, G, and H).

b. Coordinate and establish theater military policy and procedures as necessary to comply with reference a and FSC-approved measures.

c. Coordinate with and provide USEUCOM all information required by reference a on equipment, troops, and activities in theater for the annual exchange of military information, contacts (visits to airbases), prior notification of certain military activities, observation of certain military activities, annual calendars, and constraining provisions (See Appendixes A through D, G, and Enclosure C, paragraph

4. DIA. Provide support to the Joint Staff as required on all CSBM-related matters.

5. USDELMC

a. Facilitate coordination of all reference a and FSC-approved measures information between the USG and its allies as directed.

b. Coordinate evaluation and inspection visits with the Verification Coordination Committee.

c. Provide the Joint Staff all information required by reference a and FSC-approved measures provided by other participating states of NATO to the International Military Staff (INS).

d. Provide USEUCOM and USACOM all information required by reference a and FSC-approved measures, particularly information on matters impacting on both commands, provided by other participating states of NATO.

6. OSIA

a. Conduct active inspections and evaluations and perform US escort and liaison functions during passive inspections and evaluations (See Appendixes E and F).

NOTE: In accordance with USD(A) memorandum, 20 June 1991, OSIA will also serve as the senior USG representative during passive inspections and evaluations. It also specifies that commanders of inspected and evaluated formation or units will retain overall on-site responsibility for compliance by those formations and units with the requirements of reference a.

b. Coordinate planning with USEUCOM, USACOM, and the Joint Staff to ensure compliance with reference a regarding inspections and evaluations.

c. Coordinate with USEUCOM on passive observations in the event of simultaneous passive observation and inspection of the same exercise.

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APPENDIX A TO ENCLOSURE D

PROCEDURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING THE  
ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION

1. Procedures. All US data for the annual exchange of military information will be transmitted through diplomatic channels by the Department of State, European Division (DOS, EUR/RPM), based on information provided by the Joint Staff. USEUCOM will provide the Joint Staff with the required data to prepare annual exchange of military information. The Joint Staff will validate the accuracy and completeness of the input by coordinating with the Services and appropriate US Defense agencies.

2. Policy. The Joint Staff, J-5, Conventional Arms Control Division, is the action agency within the US military for annual exchange of military information.

3. Responsibilities

a. Joint Staff

(1) Coordinate with USEUCOM, USACOM, and Services 90 days prior to 15 December to initiate the collection of the data required for submitting the annual exchange of military information.

(2) Ensure that the US data submission uses the same data base for the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and CSBM information exchange.

(3) Ensure that the definitions contained in the CFE Treaty and the equipment listed in the Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment of the CFE Treaty are used in the annual exchange of military information.

(4) Coordinate and schedule, if necessary, IAW established suspense but NLT 1 December, a Data Validation Conference to review the annual exchange of military information.

(5) Provide the annual exchange of military information to USD(A&T) for review and approval NLT 6 working days prior to 15 December.

(6) Provide DOS, EUR/RPM, the draft annual exchange of military information NLT 4 working days prior to 15 December for interagency review and approval. DOS will ensure that the official annual exchange of military information is received by the other participating states NLT 15 December of each year.

(7) Ensure USEUCOM, USACOM, OSIA, and the Services receive official copies of the annual exchange of military information.

(8) Inform USAMC LOUISA of the final version of the charts used in the exchange of military information.

b. USEUCOM

(1) Initiate coordination with USACOM and component commands NLT 90 days prior to 15 December to initiate the collection of the data required for submitting the annual exchange of military information.

(2) Ensure that the definitions contained in the CFE Treaty and the equipment listed in the Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment of the CFE Treaty are used in the annual exchange of military information.

(3) Collect and validate the annual exchange of military information from USACOM and component commands and submit to the Joint Staff NLT 1 working day before the start of the conference.

(4) Coordinate with USACOM and component commands to ensure representation, if required, at the Data Validation Conference scheduled NLT 1 December.

(5) Direct all questions concerning final resolution of reporting requirements, definitions, and rules of aggregation to the Joint Staff for resolution.

c. USACOM. Provide USEUCOM the required data for the annual exchange of military information NLT 15 November.

(1) Provide a representative if requested by USEUCOM to attend the Data Validation Conference.

(2) Coordinate with USEUCOM and assist their efforts as outlined in subparagraph 3b Appendix A to Enclosure D.



APPENDIX B TO ENCLOSURE D

PROCEDURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING ANNUAL  
CALENDARS AND CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS

1. Procedures. All inputs required for annual calendars and constraining provisions will be transmitted through diplomatic channels by DOS, EUR/RPM, based on information provided by the Joint Staff. USEUCOM will provide the Joint Staff with the required data to submit the draft calendar and constraining provisions. The Joint Staff will validate the accuracy and completeness of the input by coordinating with IMS, the NATO allies, the Services, and appropriate US Defense agencies.

2. Policy. The Joint Staff, J-5, Conventional Arms Control Division, is the action agency within the US military for annual calendars and constraining provisions. Initial input from USEUCOM is unofficial; therefore, it should be limited in its distribution.

3. Responsibilities

a. Joint Staff

(1) Conduct preliminary coordination with J-7 (Joint Exercise Division, Joint Staff), USEUCOM (ECJ5), and USACOM (J53) during June of each year to facilitate the completeness and accuracy of USEUCOM's input to the annual calendar and constraining provisions for the upcoming year.

(2) Coordinate with and obtain USEUCOM draft annual calendar and constraining provisions NLT 1 October of each year.

(3) Submit the draft annual calendar and constraining provisions to US Mission NATO and USDELMC for review by IMS and the allies NLT 15 October of each year.

(4) Obtain draft allied annual calendars and constraining provisions from USDELMC NLT 15 October of each year. Provide comments or concurrence on the calendars to USDELMC NLT 31 October of each year.

(5) Obtain IMS comments or concurrence on the annual calendar and constraining provisions from USDELMC NLT 31 October of each year and incorporate them in the annual calendar.

(6) Provide DOS, EUR/RPM, the draft annual calendar and constraining provisions with IMS input NLT 1 November of each year. The interagency will review the calendar before submission to the other participating states.

NOTES: (a) DOS will forward the draft annual calendar to US Embassies in those countries participating in exercises involving US forces for final coordination.

(b) DOS will transmit the official calendar to respective US Embassies in the other participating states NLT 12 November of each year.

(7) Ensure information on activities forecasted in the annual calendar and subsequently canceled or reduced below notifiable thresholds and information on military activities subject to prior notification not included in the annual calendar are provided to DOS, EUR/RPM, for transmission to the other participating states.

(8) Ensure that DOS, EUR/RPM, is informed if no military activity subject to prior notification is forecasted for the calendar year.

(9) Ensure that USEUCOM; USDELMC; USACOM; OSIA; the Services; NMCC; and J-7, Joint Staff, receive official US calendars as well as changes and/or cancellations to the calendar.

b. USEUCOM

(1) Coordinate with USACOM to obtain the required data NLT 22 September of each year, amphibious as well as ground force, for the annual calendar and constraining provisions. Information should include USACOM elements participating in allied hosted military activities with allied troop totals breaching notification thresholds.

(2) Collect and validate the data from Service components and appropriate Defense agencies required for the annual calendar and constraining provisions.

(3) Provide the Joint Staff with the required data (including USACOM data) for the annual calendar and constraining provisions NLT 1 October of each year.

(4) Ensure information on activities reported in the annual calendar and subsequently canceled or reduced below notifiable thresholds and information on military activities subject to prior notification not included in the annual calendar are provided to the Joint Staff in a timely manner.

(5) Ensure that the Joint Staff is informed if no military activity subject to prior notification is forecasted for the calendar year.

(6) Coordinate with Ministry of Defense (MOD) Bonn or other host-state MODs, as required, before submission of the draft annual calendar to ensure uniformity of action between the host-state MOD and the USG. This informal coordination will be accomplished as needed and will not involve policy matters.

c. USDELMC

(1) Staff the annual calendar and constraining provisions (to be received by 15 October) for comment by the INS and the appropriate allies. Provide comments or concurrence on the draft annual calendar to the Joint Staff NLT 28 October of each year.

(2) Provide the Joint Staff with draft allied annual calendars NLT 15 October of each year. The Joint Staff is to provide comment or concurrence NLT 1 November of each year.

(3) Represent the Joint Staff at the NATO Military Committee meetings and facilitate the flow of information between the Joint Staff and IMS.

d. USACOM

(1) Collect and validate amphibious data from component commands concerning the annual calendar and constraining provisions.

(2) Coordinate with and provide USEUCOM with the required amphibious data for the annual calendar and constraining provisions NLT 22 September of each year.

(3) Ensure USEUCOM is informed if no military activity subject to prior notification is forecasted for the calendar year.

4. Format. Formats for all required CSBM messages are included in Annex B of the Notification Management System (NMS) User's Manual.

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APPENDIX C TO ENCLOSURE D

PROCEDURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING PRIOR NOTIFICATION  
OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND ALERTS (NOTIFIABLE  
ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT WITHOUT ADVANCED NOTICE)

1. Procedures. All inputs required for prior notification of certain military activities and alerts will be transmitted through diplomatic channels by DOS, EUR/RPM, based on information provided by the Joint Staff. USEUCOM will provide the Joint Staff with the required data for individual activity notifications. The Joint Staff will validate the accuracy and completeness of the input by coordinating with IMS, NATO allies, Services, and appropriate US Defense agencies.

2. Responsibilities

a. Individual Activity Notifications

(1) Joint Staff

(a) Conduct preliminary coordination with USEUCOM; J-7, Joint Staff; and USACOM 90 days before the start of an activity to facilitate accurate and complete input to DOS on individual activity notifications.

(b) For multinational activities, coordinate with the appropriate allies as necessary to facilitate accurate and complete information.

(c) Obtain USEUCOM input to the draft activity notification NLT 70 days before the start of the activity.

(d) Submit the USG draft activity notification to US Mission NATO and USDELMC for review by IMS NLT 65 days in advance of the start of the activity.

(e) Obtain USDELMC comments or concurrence on the notifications NLT 50 days in advance of the activity's commencement and incorporate in the notification as appropriate.

(f) Provide DOS, EUR/RPM, the draft of activity notifications with IMS inputs NLT 49 days in advance of the activity's commencement. The USG CSBM Working Group will review the draft notification before DOS transmits the official notification to the respective American Embassy in the participating state NLT 45 days before the start of the activity.

(g) Ensure that USEUCOM; USDELMC; USACOM; USCENTCOM; NMCC; OSIA; and J-7, Joint Staff, receive copies of the official notification.

(2) USEUCOM

- (a) Collect and validate data from USACOM and component commands concerning individual activity notifications.
- (b) Provide the Joint Staff with individual activity notifications NLT 70 days before the start of the activity.
- (c) Provide the Joint Staff comprehensive notification information regarding exercise-related activities 80 days in advance of the start date. Include air and sea arrival and/or redeployment points and POMCUS sites being used.
- (d) Provide the Joint Staff a draft copy of the host-state notification of exercise-related activities 60 days in advance of the start date.
- (e) Coordinate with MOD Bonn and/or other host-state MODs as required on notifiable activities. Coordination will not involve policy matters.

(3) USDELMC

- (a) Coordinate the information of the USG input within NATO regarding activity notifications.
- (b) Obtain USG draft activity notifications NLT 60 days before the start of the activity for formal staffing and comment by the appropriate allies.
- (c) Provide comment and/or concurrence on activity notifications to the Joint Staff NLT 50 days before the start of the activity.
- (d) Provide the Joint Staff with draft allied activity notifications NLT 55 days before the start of the activity.
- (e) Obtain Joint Staff comments and/or concurrence on allied draft activity notifications NLT 50 days before the start of the activity.

(4) USACOM

(a) Review forecast of annual training exercises for activities and identify those activities meeting notification levels.

(b) Provide input, where appropriate, to USEUCOM regarding individual activity notifications NLT 70 days in advance of the start date of that activity.

NOTE: This input does not include independent naval or air activities but may include large-scale amphibious landings in the zone.

b. Activities With No Prior Notification (Alerts).

Activities conducted without prior notification to the troops involved (i.e., alerts) are exempt from the 42-day prior notification provision of reference a. Notification will be given at the time the troops involved commence such activities. The Joint Staff and USEUCOM will be required to coordinate with the host state(s), draft the notification, clear it with the CSBM Working Group, and provide it to DOS for transmission to all other participating states.

(1) USEUCOM will notify the Joint Staff, J-5, Conventional Arms Control Division, as soon as a notifiable alert activity is planned (a minimum of 7 days before the start of the activity).

(2) All coordination required for individual activity notifications will apply to alerts, but the timeline will be accelerated to "as soon as possible" so that the activity can be notified.

3. Formats. Formats for all required CSBM messages are included in Annex B of the Notification Management System (NMS) User's Manual.

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APPENDIX D TO ENCLOSURE D

PROCEDURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING THE  
OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

1. Procedures. All inputs required for observation of certain military activities will be transmitted through diplomatic channels by DOS, EUR/RPM, based on information provided by the Joint Staff. USEUCOM will provide the Joint Staff with the required data for individual observations.

2. Policy. Joint Staff, J-5, Conventional Arms Control Division, is the action agency within the US military for observations; however, USEUCOM will execute most of the provisions. For each notified observation, the USG will always attempt to send two observers, the maximum allowable number, and will seek participation from the USDAO in the host state to fill one of these positions.

3. Responsibilities

a. Joint Staff

(1) Coordinate the military effort in planning, organizing, and executing the USG observation program.

(2) Assess all participating states' annual calendars for potential observable exercises, and provide this assessment to USEUCOM.

(3) Direct, through USEUCOM, the organization, training, and conduct of the USG observation effort.

(4) Coordinate with USEUCOM to obtain the names of the two members of the observation team and submit the names to DOS NLT 14 days after the issue of the invitation to observe. (DOS must respond to the host state NLT 21 days after the issue of the invitation to observe.)

b. USEUCOM

(1) Active Observation Program

(a) Act on behalf of the Joint Staff in organizing, planning, and conducting the observation program.

(b) Provide the observation team as directed by the Joint Staff for observable military activities when USG is invited by another participating state.

(c) Coordinate with the Defense Attache Office in the host state to obtain the name of its

representative. If the DAO declines to provide an observer, USEUCOM, in coordination with the Joint Staff, will fill the DAO allocation with a suitable representative.

(d) Provide names of the observers (including USDAO representative) as directed by the Joint Staff.

(e) Ensure that the observation team possesses the requisite language, country skills, and military expertise to successfully carry out the observation.

(f) Ensure that potential observers remain current in their training and preparation and that each member possesses a current passport.

(g) Coordinate with USDAO to ensure linkup of observers before arrival at the observer program rendezvous point.

(h) Brief the observation team at headquarters, USEUCOM, before its departure for observer duty, if possible.

(i) Obtain, as required, clearance for use of US military aircraft in transporting the US observation team to the host state.

(j) Debrief the observation team at headquarters, USEUCOM, upon completion of the observation, if possible.

(k) Assist the team in preparing its written observation report for transmission to the Joint Staff (J-5, Conventional Arms Control Division) NLT 10 working days after completing the observation program.

(2) Passive Observation Program. USG will never be the state for an observable activity in Europe. The state is responsible for extending invitations for activities conducted on host state soil.

(a) Act on behalf of the Joint Staff in coordinating with the host state for the conduct of the observation program.

(b) Provide to the Joint Staff, for approval, a draft of all observation programs 70 days in advance of that programs start date.

- (c) Provide information on any observable US activity announced in the annual calendar that is to be reduced below the required threshold or canceled.
- (d) Ensure that the observation program clearly establishes the nonthreatening nature of the activity and satisfies the reasonable requests of the observers.
- (e) Ensure that personnel and troops taking part in the observed exercise are adequately informed as to the presence, status, and functions of the observers.
- (f) Coordinate with the host state when US troops are involved to ensure that observer transportation, commencement briefing, and observation equipment are provided.
- (g) Provide qualified escorts and liaison officers to the host-state's escort team when US troops are involved. Escort and liaison officers should provide the interface between the US forces and the host-state's escorts.
- (h) Ensure escorts and liaison officers assigned to assist the host-state escorts are familiar with restricted locations, installations, and defense sites (not accessible to observers).
- (i) Provide escort teams during exercise-related exercises as delegated by the host state.

c. USDELMC. Facilitate the sharing of observation visit reports between USG and its allies.

4. Formats. Formats for all required CSBM messages are included in Annex B of the Notification Management System (NMS) User's Manual.

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APPENDIX E TO ENCLOSURE D

PROCEDURES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND GUIDANCE  
CONCERNING INSPECTIONS

1. Procedures. Inspections can produce increased confidence regarding the nature and intent of any state's activities. Technically, an inspection is directed against a geographic area, not a specific unit, specified by the inspecting state where an agreed CSBM is in doubt.

2. Policy

a. US territory is not subject to inspections; hence, the United States cannot be the host (receiving state) to an inspection. The role played by the United States during a passive inspection as defined in the bilateral agreements is limited to that of advising US forces inside the inspection area and assisting the host and/or receiving state.

b. OSIA, with policy guidance from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and OSD, is responsible for the conduct of active inspections. Support requirements for active inspections are delineated in the MOU among USEUCOM, USACOM, and OSIA.

c. USEUCOM and USACOM, with policy guidance from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and OSC, are responsible for the conduct of passive inspections of US forces in the VDOC 92 AOA.

3. Responsibilities

a. Joint Staff

(1) Coordinate with the Services on all matters pertaining to inspections.

(2) Coordinate, for active inspections, with the CSBM ad hoc working group to determine whether representatives from other participating states should be invited to join the US inspection team.

b. USEUCOM and USACOM (Passive Inspection Program)

(1) Coordinate planning with OSIA to ensure compliance with the inspection provisions of reference a.

(2) Ensure commanders of units and formations present within the specified area are kept fully advised of all information pertaining to the requested inspection.

- (3) Inform OSIA of all military activities, operations, and exercises within the area specified in the inspection request.
- (4) Provide requested data on US forces participating in activities within the specified area of the inspection to OSIA and host and/or receiving state point of contact.
- (5) Ensure commanders retain overall responsibility for compliance with the requirements or reference a.
- (6) Provide the OSIA team chief information on areas or sensitive points to which access is normally denied or restricted during inspections.
- (7) Provide OSIA with liaison officer(s) from the appropriate exercise directing headquarters for any exercise occurring within the specified area to interface among OSIA, US forces, host, and receiving state escort officers.
- (8) Ensure liaison officer(s) are prepared to brief inspectors on the nature and scope of the activities taking place within the specified area.
- (9) If a NATO command is conducting an activity in the specified area, ensure the commander of the US contingent in the exercise and/or activity provides a liaison officer to brief the inspectors on the nature and scope of US participation in the activity.
- (10) Ensure the liaison team size is kept to the absolute minimum required. Higher headquarters should have no more than one member per agency.
- (11) Ensure, in coordination with OSIA and the receiving state, that no actions are taken that could endanger the inspection team. Commanders must ensure their personnel are briefed on the upcoming inspection, particularly the presence, status, and functions of the inspection team.
- (12) Forward inspection after-action reports to OSIA and the Joint Staff and disseminate lessons learned.
- (13) Provide, in coordination with OSIA and the host or receiving state, theater public affairs guidance concerning inspection visits.

c. OSIA

(1) Formulate, train, and lead inspection teams for conducting active inspections on the territory of other participating states.

(2) Develop plans and, in close coordination with USEUCOM and USACOM, prepare to assist the receiving state in the escort of inspectors from other participating states.

(3) Formulate, train, and lead the escort/liaison teams for passive inspections.

(4) Control US escorts and perform liaison functions with the receiving state representatives.

(5) Serve as the senior USG representative during passive inspections.

(6) Provide official USG interpretation for reference a issues during the course of the inspection and resolve all document-related issues between site personnel, inspection teams, and the receiving host-state representatives.

(7) Provide US commanders advice and assistance as requested and be present at all contacts between US forces and inspectors.

(8) Notify inspectors of sensitive points and restricted areas, as necessary.

(9) Notify the NMCC, USEUCOM, USACOM, and Service Operations Centers of requested inspections. Pass host and/or receiving state data to USEUCOM Command Center at the earliest possible moment.

(10) Ensure USEUCOM and USACOM receive inspection reports, active and passive.

4. Formats. Formats for all required CSBM messages are included in Annex B of the Notification Management System (NMS) User's Manual.

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APPENDIX F TO ENCLOSURE D

PROCEDURES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND GUIDANCE CONCERNING  
EVALUATION OF INFORMATION ON MILITARY FORCES

1. Procedures. Reference a provisions, although generally clear in their requirements, do not articulate well the concept under which the evaluation provisions were negotiated and agreed. The concept is to give participating states an opportunity to gain an impression of the general validity of other states' information. These provisions for evaluations are intended as a vehicle for openness and transparency and not, as in the case of CFE inspections, a program of strict accounting. CSBM evaluation visits are to be conducted under provisions that contribute to the process of openness and transparency while simultaneously limiting the rigor of the accounting. CSBM evaluation visits last up to 12 hours and are not permitted to interfere with the normal activities of the unit or formation visited. The United States is liable to receive only one evaluation visit per year under reference a based on current force structure.

2. Police

a. Current USG policy on CSBM evaluation visits is to provide access to evaluated units by evaluators of another participating state in the most open, forthright, and unrestricted way possible, circumstances permitting and with due consideration for safety, sensitive points, and activities that should be kept to a minimum. The USG intent is to provide a positive impression of our forces and our way of life to representatives from other states, particularly those from Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR.

b. OSIA, with policy guidance from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the OSD, is responsible for the conduct of active evaluations. Support requirements for evaluations are delineated in the MOU among USEUCOM, USACOM, and OSIA.

3. Responsibilities

a. Joint Staff

(1) Forward requests for evaluation visits to OSIA and to USEUCOM and USACOM for transmission to the formation or unit to be evaluated.

(2) Coordinate with the Services on all matters pertaining to requests for evaluation visits.

(3) Forward the formation or unit commander's recommended response to an evaluation request to the USG interagency decisionmaking process to formulate the USG response (acceptance or refusal).

b. USEUCOM and USACOM

(1) Coordinate planning with OSIA and component commands and ensure compliance with reference a.

(2) Develop plans for implementation of the evaluation provisions of reference a.

(3) Provide a recommended response to an evaluation request to the Joint Staff. Ensure recommendation for refusal includes reasons and number of days the formation or unit will not be available. If the formation or unit is outside its normal peacetime location, include the reasons for, and the duration of, the absence.

(4) Inform OSIA of all military activities, operations, and scheduled exercises that may have an impact on the requested evaluation visit.

(5) Provide, in coordination with OSIA and the host state, theater public affairs guidance concerning evaluation visits.

(6) Ensure the commander, or deputy if the commander is not available, of the evaluated formation or unit provides a briefing on personnel and major weapon and equipment systems of the formation or unit reported in the information exchange. The evaluation begins with a briefing that includes:

(a) Information provided in the last information exchange, the current status of that information, and the reasons, if any, for differences.

(b) A map depicting the location of command subelements and a schematic of the locations subject to evaluation.

(c) Information on the location of unit facilities, including flight lines and vehicle parks.

(d) Information on the unit's mission, location, activities, and training.

(7) Ensure that the briefing does not include information on US CSBM data base management.

(8) Ensure outside participants of the briefing, especially individuals from higher headquarters, refrain from providing information during the briefing. (Does not preclude questions being answered by members of the formation or unit.)

(9) Ensure commanders of evaluated formations or units:

(a) Recommend to the evaluation team a route that provides the best opportunity to see formation or unit personnel and equipment. The evaluation team is not obligated to accept the recommendation and may dictate its own route.

(b) Retain overall responsibility for compliance by the formation or unit with the requirements of reference a.

(c) Provide the OSIA escort team chief information on sensitive points, facilities, and equipment.

(d) Provide key personnel for the duration of the evaluation to facilitate access to buildings or areas where personnel or major weapon and equipment systems of the evaluated formation or unit are located.

(e) For unit evaluations, provide the evaluators the possibility to see the personnel and equipment reported in the information exchange (a visit to the unit's areas, barracks, mess halls, a drive-through of the on-base housing areas, and the motor pool area or flight line).

(f) For formation evaluations, provide a briefing. This briefing is all that is required. However, to further openness and transparency, the commander should make every effort to provide the possibility to see personnel and some of the major weapon systems reported for the formation.

NOTE: Commanders could show any of the formation's subordinate units that were **not** reported separately in reference a. **In no case** will a commander show a unit that has been reported separately in the information exchange.

(10) Encourage commanders to allow evaluators to observe ongoing unit training on the facility or nearby training areas (not to include locations that require the unit to depart the local training area). However, commanders are not required to disrupt training or stage special training exercises for the evaluators , benefit.

(11) Ensure evaluators are provided the opportunity to talk with formation or unit personnel.

(12) Commanders may informally arrange to take photographs for publicity and goodwill purposes. No equipment except personal binoculars and dictaphones may be used by the evaluation team.

(13) Ensure the liaison team size is kept to the absolute minimum required. Higher headquarters should have no more than one member per agency. Personnel above this guideline will be coordinated and agreed between OSIA and USEUCOM before the evaluation visit. The commander of the evaluated formation or unit may choose an appropriate number from his or her staff.

(14) Ensure no actions are taken that could endanger the evaluation team. Commanders must ensure their personnel are briefed on the upcoming evaluation, particularly the presence, status, and functions of the evaluation team.

c. OSIA

(1) Formulate, train, and lead evaluation teams to conduct active evaluations on the territory of other participating states.

(2) Formulate, train, and lead the escort teams for passive evaluations. Provide, under normal circumstances, one escort for every evaluator. Personnel above the limit of one escort for every evaluator will be coordinated between OSIA and USEUCOM before the evaluation visit. Higher headquarters and local personnel composing the liaison team will report to the OSIA team chief during the evaluation.

(3) Perform US escort and liaison functions in the reception of passive evaluation visits.

(4) Notify the NMCC, USEUCOM, USACOM, and Service Operations Centers of notifications of evaluation requests by other participating states.

(5) Develop plans and, in close coordination with the Services and responsible CINCs, prepare to assist the host state in the escort of the evaluation team.

(6) Control US escorts and perform liaison functions with the host-state representatives.

- (7) Serve as the senior USG representative during passive evaluations.
- (8) Provide official USG on-site interpretation of reference a to commanders during passive evaluations and resolve all document-related issues among site personnel, evaluation teams, and host-state representatives.
- (9) Ensure no equipment except personal binoculars and dictaphones are used by the evaluation team. No other equipment is allowed.
- (10) Declare sensitive points, equipment, and facilities (provided by the formation or unit commander) to the evaluation team when necessary. CFE restrictions on access will be the basis for the declaration of sensitive points during CSBM evaluation visits.
- (11) Brief the CSBM ad hoc working group on the results and lessons learned from the evaluation visit.

4. Formats. Formats for all required CSBM messages are included in Annex B of the Notification Management System (NMS) User's Manual.

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APPENDIX G TO ENCLOSURE D

PROCEDURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES  
CONCERNING VISITS TO AIRBASES

1. Procedures. All inputs required for visits to airbases will be transmitted through diplomatic channels by DOS, EUR/RPM, based on information provided by the Joint Staff. USEUCOM will provide the Joint Staff with the required data for visits to airbases.

2. Policy. The Joint Staff, J-S, Conventional Arms Control Division, is the action agency within the US military for airbase visits; however, USEUCOM will execute most of the provisions. The USG will always attempt to send two visitors, the maximum allowable number, to each notified airbase visit, and USEUCOM will seek participation from the USDAO in the host state to fill one of these positions.

3. Responsibilities

a. Joint Staff

(1) Coordinate with DOS, USEUCOM, USACOM, and the Services in determining the timeframe and airbase to be visited when USG arranges a visit.

(2) Coordinate with USEUCOM, USACOM, and the Services on all matters pertaining to airbase visits, both active and passive.

(3) Coordinate and direct, through USEUCOM, the military effort in planning, organizing, and executing the USG airbase visit program.

(4) Coordinate with USEUCOM to ensure that host responsibilities delegated in the invitation are properly executed.

(5) Coordinate with USEUCOM to obtain the names of the two members of the USG visit team for submission to DOS NLT 14 days after the issue of an invitation to visit.

NOTE: DOS must respond NLT 21 days after the issue of an invitation.

b. USEUCOM

(1) Active Airbase Visit Program

(a) Act on behalf of the Joint Staff in organizing, planning, and conducting the visits to airbases.

(b) Provide the airbase visit team as directed by the Joint Staff in response to an invitation to visit by a participating state.

(c) Coordinate with the DAO in the host state to obtain the name of its representative. If the DAO declines to provide an observer, USEUCOM, in coordination with the Joint Staff, will fill the DAO allocation with a suitable representative.

(d) Submit the names of the visit team (including USDAO representative) to the Joint Staff NLT 14 days after issue of the invitation to visit. Ensure that the visit team possesses the requisite language, country skills, and military expertise to successfully carry out the airbase visit.

(e) Coordinate with USDAO and the Joint Staff to ensure linkup of visit team members before arrival at the program rendezvous point.

(f) Obtain, as required, clearance for use of US military aircraft in transporting US airbase visit team to the host state, if required.

(g) Assist the team in preparing its written airbase visit report for transmission to Joint Staff, J-5, Conventional Arms Control Division, NLT 10 working days after completing the airbase visit.

(2) Passive Airbase Visit Program. USG will never be the host state for an airbase visit in Europe. The host state, in coordination with the United States, is responsible for extending airbase visit invitations to the other participating states.

(a) Serve as the official USG representative for interpretation of VDOC 92 during passive airbase visits.

(b) Act on behalf of the Joint Staff in coordinating with the host state for receiving airbase visits by representatives of other participating states.

(c) Coordinate with the host state to ensure that host responsibilities delegated in the invitation are properly carried out.



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- (d) Coordinate the program for the visit and visitor access with the host state.
- (e) Coordinate with the host state to ensure that visiting team board, lodging, and transportation are provided.
- (f) Coordinate with the host state to ensure the visiting teams are provided the opportunity to meet at the close of the visit with host state officials and senior airbase personnel to discuss the course of the visit.
- (g) Provide, as delegated, a briefing on the purpose and functions of the airbase and on current activity at the airbase.
- (h) Provide qualified escorts and liaison officers to the host-state escort teams. Escort and liaison officers should provide the interface between the US forces and the host-state escorts.
- (i) Ensure escorts and liaison officers assigned to assist the host-state escorts are familiar with restricted locations, installations, and defense sites (not accessible to observers).
- (j) Ensure visitors are given the opportunity to view activities on base, including preparations to carry out base functions, to gain an impression of the approximate number of sorties and types of missions flown. This might be done by a visit to:
  - 1. An operational flying squadron and attendance at an operational briefing. View mission planning exercise and mission preparation.
  - 2. Maintenance facilities with a short briefing on the functions. View the facilities, the flight line, and the phase hangar.
  - 3. Logistics with a short briefing.
  - 4. The combat support group and civil engineering facilities.
  - 5. Radar approach control or other radar facility, control tower to observe flying operations, and possibly ground control intercept site.

(k) Provide the opportunity to communicate with commanders and troops in various functional areas, such as operations, support, and logistics.

(1) Provide the opportunity to view different types of combat aircraft assigned to the base.

c. USDELMC. Facilitate the sharing of airbase visit reports between USG and its allies.

4. Formats. Formats for all required CSBM messages are included in Annex 8 of the Notification Management System (NMS) User's Manual.

APPENDIX H TO ENCLOSURE D

PROCEDURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING DEMONSTRATION  
OF NEW TYPES OF MAJOR WEAPON AND EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS

1. Procedures

a. The first participating state that deploys a new type of major weapon or equipment system as specified in the provisions of the exchange of military information (paragraphs 10 through 15, reference a) will arrange a demonstration of the equipment item for representatives of all the other states. This requirement will not apply if another state has already conducted a demonstration of the same major weapon or equipment system. The host state is responsible for setting the time, place, program, and modalities for the demonstration. Demonstrations can be done in conjunction with some other CSCE activity (e.g., airbase visit) as a joint event with one or several other participating states; as a separate, distinct event; or completely outside a CSBM event, such as during an air or trade show.

b. All inputs required for demonstrations of new major weapon and equipment systems will be transmitted through diplomatic channels by DOS, EUR/RPM, based on information provided by the Joint Staff. USEUCOM will provide the Joint Staff with the required data for demonstrations.

2. Policy. The Joint Staff, J-5, Conventional Arms Control Division, is the action agency within the US military for demonstrations; however, USEUCOM will execute most of the provisions.

3. Responsibilities

a. Joint Staff

(1) Coordinate with DOS, USEUCOM, USACOM, and the Services in determining the date, location, program content, and modalities when USG conducts a demonstration.

(a) Coordinate, through USDELMC, with the IMS to verify no other state has already demonstrated the major weapon or equipment system.

(b) Ensure a valid requirement exists for conducting a demonstration.

(c) Determine if the demonstration will be executed as a separate event or conducted in conjunction with another activity or CSBM event.

(2) Provide information to DOS for use in preparing USG invitations to a US-hosted visit.

NOTE: This preparation may involve some coordination (clearance) with the country on whose territory the US demonstration will take place.

(3) Coordinate with USEUCOM, USACOM, and the Services on all matters pertaining to demonstrations, both active and passive.

(4) Coordinate and direct, through USEUCOM, the military effort in planning, organizing, and executing the USG demonstration program.

(5) Coordinate with USEUCOM to obtain the two members of the USG visit team for active demonstrations NLT 14 days after issuance of an invitation to attend a demonstration.

NOTE: DOS must respond NLT 21 days after the issue of an invitation.

(6) Assist USEUCOM, by serving as a liaison, in coordinating US participation in a multistate demonstration (air show or trade show).

b. USEUCOM

(1) Active Demonstration Program

(a) Organize and execute the USG attendance at demonstrations.

(b) Provide the demonstration visit team as directed by the Joint Staff in response to an invitation to attend a demonstration. A representative from the DAO in the host state and a USEUCOM nominated representative will compose the team. If the DAO declines the opportunity to provide a representative, USEUCOM will coordinate with the Joint Staff for a replacement. On an exceptional basis, the Joint Staff may elect to fill the position normally reserved for the USEUCOM representative.

(c) Submit the names of the visit team members to the Joint Staff NLT 14 days after issue of the invitation to the demonstration. For protocol reasons, one individual should be, if possible,

an 0-5 or above. In providing the team members' names, include their rank, date of birth, place of birth, and passport number, place of issue, and expiration date.

(d) Ensure that the visit team possesses the requisite language, country skills, and military expertise to successfully observe the demonstration.

(e) Coordinate with USDAO and the Joint Staff to ensure linkup of visit team members before arrival at the demonstration place of assembly.

(f) Obtain, as required, clearance for use of US military aircraft in transporting US demonstration visit team to the host state.

(g) Assist the team in preparing its written after-action report on the demonstration. Transmit the report to the Joint Staff, J-5, Conventional Arms Control Division, NLT 10 working days after returning from the demonstration.

(2) Passive Demonstration Program

(a) Serve as the official USG representative for interpretation of the VDOC 92 during passive demonstrations.

(b) Plan, organize, and execute demonstrations as directed by the Joint Staff.

(c) Coordinate with the country on whose territory the US demonstration will take place.

1. To ensure there are no conflicts or restrictions on conducting the demonstration.

2. To receive and host representatives of other participating states.

3. To develop a demonstration program consistent with the laws and regulations of the country on whose territory the demonstration will take place.

(d) Arrange for appropriate transportation of observers during the conduct of the demonstration. Transportation support should begin and conclude at a place of assembly specified in the invitation to the demonstration. States invited to the

demonstration are responsible for travel expenses to and from the place of assembly for the demonstration and, if applicable, costs for accommodation during the visit.

(e) Ensure observers have the opportunity to meet at the close of the demonstration and discuss the event with the senior officials responsible for the demonstration. It may also be appropriate to have selected technical experts on the system available to talk with observers.

(f) Provide a briefing on the purpose and agenda of the demonstration.

(g) Provide qualified escorts to facilitate the conduct of the demonstration and to serve as moderators during the demonstration. There may be a requirement to include a liaison officer from the country on whose territory the demonstration is taking place.

(h) Ensure escorts and liaison officers are familiar with sensitive points and restricted locations not accessible to observers.

(i) Establish a demonstration program that includes the following:

1. A demonstration of the new weapon or equipment system. An operational demonstration is permissible but is not required for a demonstration.
2. An opportunity for observers to physically view the weapon or equipment system. An unclassified viewing of its internal configuration is acceptable.
3. An opportunity to meet and speak with qualified equipment crew members.
4. Appropriate safety briefing and gear for observers.
5. Transportation to and from demonstration sites and appropriate viewing facilities and devices (i.e., binoculars).

(j) In the event of a multistate demonstration or air or trade show event, coordinate and delineate

responsibilities among the participants for the conduct of the equipment demonstrations. This coordination may include:

1. An agreed order or agenda for the demonstration.
2. Transportation requirements (if applicable).
3. Briefing and host responsibilities.
4. Timing and location.
5. Invitations.

c. USDELMC. Facilitate the sharing of demonstration program reports between USG and its allies.

4. Formats. Formats for all required CSBM messages are included in Annex B of the Notification Management System (NMS) User's Manual.

APPENDIX I TO ENCLOSURE D

PROCEDURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING  
HAZARDOUS INCIDENTS OF A MILITARY NATURE

1. Procedures. The Department of State, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Office of European Security and Political Affairs (telephone (202) 647-1135) is the point of contact for hazardous incidents during regular working hours (0800 to 1800, eastern time, Monday through Friday). The Department of State Operations Center (telephone (202) 647-1512) is the point of contact during nonduty hours (1800 to 0800, eastern time, Saturdays, Sundays, and US holidays). Potential hazardous incident will be reported through the NMCS to the Joint Staff and DOS. The final decision as to what constitutes a hazardous incident will be made within the USG interagency.

2. Responsibilities

a. Joint Staff

(1) Forward reports of potential hazardous incidents from USEUCOM and USACOM to DOS.

(2) Represent the US military in USG interagency decisionmaking process when evaluating reported incidents and formulating a USG response.

b. USEUCOM and USACOM

(1) Provide the in-theater points of contact for all hazardous incidents of a military nature.

(2) Report potential hazardous incidents of a military nature to the Joint Staff through NMCS.

(3) Provide the Joint Staff clarification of any hazardous incident reported by a participating state.

3. Formats. Formats for all required CSBM messages are included in Annex B of the Notification Management System (NMS) User's Manual.



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APPENDIX J TO ENCLOSURE D

PROCEDURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING THE VOLUNTARY  
HOSTING OF VISITS TO DISPEL CONCERNS ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES

1. Procedures

a. To help alleviate possible concerns about a military activity in the zone of application, a participating state may invite, at its discretion, other participating states to designate personnel accredited to the host state or other representative to take part in a visit to the area or activity in which the concern may exist. States hosting such a visit will decide which states to invite, but it is understood that states that have a concern will receive an invitation. There is no set mechanism for expressing or ascertaining such a concern under paragraph 19, reference a. The arrangements and conduct of a visit are at the discretion of the state conducting the visit, but it was envisaged by the participating states that the DAO or a similar accredited person would be invited to participate in these visits. The DAO will ordinarily be invited to take part in the visit program. If the DAO is not able to take part, another accredited person from the embassy will be designated.

b. The USG can only execute visits that involve the area of its military installations and training areas. Host states for US-stationed forces have responsibility for all other host-state territory. Coordination between host state and US-stationed forces will be necessary when a US-hosted visit to dispel concerns about a military activity is being executed.

c. All input required for a visit to dispel concerns about a military activity will be transmitted through diplomatic channels by DOS, EUR/RPM, based on information provided by the Joint Staff. USEUCOM will provide the Joint Staff with the required data for visits.

2. Responsibilities

a. Joint Staff

(1) Assist DOS in determining whether USG will execute a visit and, if so, determine the modalities for such a visit.

(2) Coordinate with DOS to validate that an actual military security concern exists and to determine the best means to alleviate this concern.

(3) Coordinate with DOS, USEUCOM, USACOM, and the Services in determining the date, location, visit agenda, states to receive invitations, and modalities when USG conducts a visit for other participating states.

(4) Assist USEUCOM in coordinating with the state on whose territory the visit will take place to ensure there are no conflicts or restrictions on conducting the visit.

(5) Provide information to DOS for use in preparing USG invitations to a US-hosted visit.

NOTE: This process will involve coordination (clearance) with the country on whose territory the visit will take place.

(6) Coordinate with USEUCOM, USACOM, and the Services on all matters pertaining to USG-sponsored visits.

(7) Coordinate and direct, through USEUCOM, the military effort in planning, organizing, and executing a USG visit program.

(8) When necessary, assist DOS in preparing a USG report on US participation in a visit.

NOTE: Preparing an after-action report on the visit is not required. Normally, the USG will produce such a report and release it to all of the participating states.

b. USEUCOM. Passive Visit Program

(1) Serve as the official USG representative for interpretation of the VDOC 92 during passive visits to dispel concerns about military activities.

(2) Plan and execute visits to dispel concerns about US military activities as directed by the Joint Staff.

(3) Coordinate with the country on whose territory the visit will take place to:

(a) Receive and host representatives of other participating states.

(b) Ensure there are no conflicts or restrictions on conducting the visit.

(c) Develop a visit program consistent with the laws and regulations of the country on whose territory the visit will take place.

(4) In conjunction with the Joint Staff, develop a visit program that:

(a) Explains the nature and purpose of the military activity.

(b) Shows the nonthreatening nature of the questioned activity.

(c) Clearly alleviates any concerns or unresolved issues surrounding the activity.

(d) Shows USG compliance with international treaties and agreements.

(e) Shows USG respect for the sovereignty and laws of the country on which the activity is taking place.

(f) Allows observers to physically view the military activity and meet with senior representatives responsible for it.

(g) Ensures the safety and security of the visitors.

(5) Arrange, as necessary, appropriate in-country transportation for invited observers.

NOTE: This process may involve coordination with the country on whose territory the visit will take place.

(6) Arrange, if appropriate, an aerial surveillance overflight of the activity in question.

NOTE: This arrangement may involve coordination with the country on whose territory the visit will take place.

(7) Provide a briefing on the purpose and agenda of the visit

(8) Afford observers an opportunity to meet and discuss the event at the close of the visit with senior officials responsible for the visit. It may be appropriate to also have senior representatives from the activity under question available to meet with observers.

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(9) Provide qualified escorts to facilitate the conduct of the visit. There may be a requirement to include a liaison officer from the country on whose territory the visit is taking place.

(10) Ensure escorts and liaison officers are familiar with sensitive points and restricted locations not accessible to observers.

(11) Provide, in coordination with the country on whose territory the visit is taking place, theater public affairs guidance concerning the visit.

c. USDELMC. Facilitate the sharing of visit program reports between USG and its allies.

3. Formats. Formats for all required CSBM messages are included in Annex B of the Notification Management System (NMS) User Is Manual.

APPENDIX K TO ENCLOSURE D

PROCEDURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES  
REGARDING MILITARY CONTACTS AND COOPERATION

1. Procedures. The provisions of the measure on military contacts and cooperation (MCC) are in addition to those in reference a. The new provisions explicitly encourage exchange visits of naval vessels, Air Force units, and joint training opportunities. In addition to the voluntary aspects of the measure, the MCC adds a visit to a military formation or facility to the requirement for airbase visits in reference a. The MCC also contains a requirement to "exchange information on agreements on programs of military contacts and cooperation concluded with other participating States within the scope of these provisions." In this regard, the measure pertains **only** to the reporting of existing agreements, not to the establishment of military contact and cooperation programs.

2. Policy

a. The Joint Staff, J-5, Conventional Arms Control Division, is the action agency within the US military for compliance with the measure on MCC.

b. As a matter of policy, the US will not sponsor any CSCE-wide MCC activities within US territory.

c. US data for the exchange of information on agreements on MCC will be transmitted through diplomatic channels by DOS, EUR/RPM, based on information provided by the Joint Staff in conjunction with the transmittal of the annual calendars (Appendix B).

3. Responsibilities

a. Joint Staff

(1) Maintain overall responsibilities for the MCC measure.

(2) Coordinate with appropriate unified commands the development of a program of military contacts within the scope of the MCC measure.

(3) Coordinate with Services to encourage participation by CSCE states in Service schools and training courses.

(4) Coordinate with USEUCOM and USACOM on joint military training programs with CSCE participating states.

(5) Coordinate and execute the MCC program outside the USEUCOM AOR.

(6) Coordinate with Services, USEUCOM, and USACOM on visits to military facilities and formations and observation of certain military activities. Coordinate with OSIA to ensure proposed dates do not conflict with other projected inspections/evaluations of US facilities.

(7) J-5 Deputy Director for Political-Military Affairs (DDPMA) will coordinate with USEUCOM, USACOM, Services, and DOD agencies to initiate the collection of data required for the timely submission of information regarding agreements on MCC. Data will be provided to J-5 DDPMA NLT 15 October each year. J-5 DDPMA will validate the accuracy of this data and consolidate input by 30 October each year.

(8) Coordinate with DOS to ensure that the official exchange of information on agreements is transmitted to the other participating states.

(9) Coordinate with USEUCOM, USACOM, and DOS on the timely response to invitations to participate in visits to military formations and facilities or observations.

b. USEUCOM

(1) Execute the military contact program within the USEUCOM AOR on behalf of the Joint Staff.

(2) Coordinate with Services to ensure sufficient utilization of service schools and training courses by CSCE participating states.

(3) Coordinate with USACOM and component commands as necessary to develop joint military training programs with CSCE participating states as appropriate.

(4) Coordinate with Joint Staff and host states to establish a program of military facility and formation visits. The US goal for this program is to complement the reference a airbase visit program in such a manner that the US will provide alternating access to an airbase or military facility or formation approximately every 30 months. This program will be restricted to bases, facilities, and formations inside the CSBM zone of application.

(5) Provide Joint Staff (J-5 DDPMA) with necessary data NLT 15 October annually to comply with the provisions of the MCC measure.

NOTE: Within the Forum for Security Cooperation, during the week of 15 November 1993, the US representative stated formally the US understanding as to the measure to exchange information on agreements on military contacts and cooperation. The term "agreements. referred to agreements on "programs" of military contacts and cooperation. That, in turn, meant those documents that established the program, i.e., the framework or umbrella documents. The reference to The scope of these provisions. meant that the obligation to provide information was limited to agreements on programs of cooperation as outlined in the paper, i.e., measures to conduct joint military exercises and training, etc. Furthermore, the staffs that implemented this agreement would not be required to provide information on the dozens of technical understandings that may derive from the implementation of programs of military contacts and cooperation. Staffs would not be expected to provide information on sensitive arrangements for military cooperation outside the scope of this document. This was the common understanding of all.

(6) Coordinate with component commands, OSIA, and host states regarding possible invitation of observers to certain military activities within the zone of application. Handle these observation events in the same manner as those specified in reference a.

c. USACOM

(1) Coordinate with USEUCOM as necessary for port visits of naval forces.

(2) Coordinate with Services and USEUCOM to achieve maximum utilization of Service schools and training courses by CSCE participating states.

(3) Coordinate with USEUCOM and component commands as necessary to develop joint military training programs with CSCE participating states, as appropriate.



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GLOSSARY

ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACV	armored combat vehicle
AIFV	armored infantry fighting vehicle
AOA	area of application (VDOC 92)
AOR	area of responsibility
APC	armored personnel carrier
ATOM	antitank guided missile
CFE	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CFX	Command Field Exercise
CINC	commanders of unified commands
CRG	Compliance Review Group
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSBM(s)	Confidence- and Security-Building Measure(s)
DAO	Defense Attache Office
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOS	Department of State
DOS, EUR/RPM	Department of State, European Division
ECJ5	USEUCOM J-5
FSC	Forum for Security Cooperation
GCI	ground control approach
HACV	heavy armament combat vehicle
IAW	in accordance with
IC	Intelligence Community
INS	International Military Staff
J53	USACOM, J53
LENA	land-based naval air
MARFOREUR	US Marine Corps Forces, Europe
MCC	military contacts and cooperation
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MPA	maritime patrol aircraft
NNA	neutral and nonaligned
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NLT	not later than
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NMCS	National Military Command System
NSC	National Security Council
NMS	Notification Management System

OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSIA	On-Site Inspection Agency
POMCUS	pre-positioned materiel configured in unit sets
RAPCON	radar approach control
SOP	standard operating procedure
TS	tactical systems
USACOM	US Atlantic Command
USAMC LOGSA	US Army Material Command, Logistics Support Agency
USAREUR	US Army, Europe
USCENTCOM	US Central Command
USCINACOM	Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command
USCINCEUR	US Commander in Chief, Europe
USDAO	US Defense Attache Office
USDELMC	US Delegation, NATO Military Committee
USEUCOM	US European Command
USG	US Government
USD(A&T)	Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Technology
USNAVEUR	US Naval Forces, Europe
VDOC	Vienna Document

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